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SUPREME COURT LAW CLERKS'
RECOLLECTIONS OF OCTOBER TERM 1951,












Welcome. The Robert H. Jackson Center exists to preserve
and advance the legacy of Justice Jackson through education,
events and exhibitry. Today's special roundtable discussion of
the Supreme Court's October Term 1951 is made possible
through the generosity of Chautauqua Institution, the Supreme
Court Historical Society, the Robert H. Jackson Center and
Chautauqua County, and we thank them. I am pleased to
introduce Professor John Barrett, who will be moderating the
first session.
* These proceedings, cosponsored by the Robert H. Jackson Center and the
Supreme Court Historical Society, occurred in the Elizabeth S. Lenna Hall,
Chautauqua Institution, Chautauqua, New York, on May 16, 2007. They have been
edited for publication.
t Partner, Phillips Lytle LLP and Chair of the Board of Directors, Robert H.
Jackson Center, Inc., Jamestown, New York.
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JOHN Q. BARRETT*
Welcome to Chautauqua Institution. Our panel brings
together five lawyers who fifty-five years ago served as law clerks
to Justices of the Supreme Court of the United States. My co-
moderator is Professor Ken Gormley of Duquesne University
School of Law. Our format will be two segments. In the first, we
will discuss the Justices and some of the cases of that Supreme
Court Term. In the second segment, which Ken will moderate,
we will discuss the Steel Seizure Cases,1 which came to the
Supreme Court in the spring of 1952.
Our honored guests and panelists are five lawyers who have
led high-achieving, diverse and public-spirited lives:
Charles C. Hileman was born in 1924 in Greensburg,
Pennsylvania. After completing one year at Allegheny College,
he entered the Army in July 1943. After six months in the Army
Specialized Training Program, he joined the 75th Infantry
Division, where he served until his discharge in December 1945.
He was a Staff Sergeant Squad Leader in the European Theater
from October 1944 until VE Day in May 1945, serving in the
Battle of the Bulge, receiving the Combat Infantry Badge, a
Bronze Star and three battle stars. In January 1946, he
returned to Allegheny College. He was active in sports, was
elected by the lettermen as Outstanding Athlete of 1947, earned
his B.A. degree that year and later was named to Allegheny's
Athletic Hall of Fame. Mr. Hileman received his J.D. degree
from The Law School of the University of Pennsylvania in 1950,
where he was Editor-in-Chief of the University of Pennsylvania
Law Review. He was the law clerk for Judge Herbert F. Goodrich
at the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
during 1950-51 and then a law clerk for Supreme Court Justice
Harold H. Burton during the Court's October Term 1951. In
June 1952, Mr. Hileman joined the Philadelphia law firm of
Schnader, Harrison, Segal & Lewis, which then, at twenty-five
lawyers, was one of the city's largest law firms. By the time of
* Professor of Law, St. John's University School of Law, New York City, and
Elizabeth S. Lenna Fellow, Robert H. Jackson Center. I thank Richard C. Spatola,
Karen J. Newbury and Andrew W. Dodd for their excellent transcribing and
research assistance.
1 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
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his retirement on January 1, 1994, the firm had grown to more
than 250 attorneys. He was a litigator throughout his career.
Among his more interesting experiences was being part of the
trial team that defended Philadelphia Communists in a criminal
prosecution under the Smith Act in 1952 and 1953. Mr. Hileman
was administrative chairman of Schnader's Litigation
Department for eight years and chairman for eight years. He
was a member of the American College of Trial Lawyers, chaired
its Ethics Committee for two years, was very active in the
Philadelphia and Pennsylvania Bar Associations, and served for
eight years as an Allegheny College trustee.
Abner J. Mikva was born in 1926 in Milwaukee, Wisconsin.
As an undergraduate, he attended the University of Wisconsin at
Madison and Washington University in St. Louis. In 1944, he
joined the United States Army Air Corps, where he was a 2nd
Lieutenant and navigator and served until November 1945. He
received his law degree from the University of Chicago, where he
was Editor-in-Chief of the University of Chicago Law Review, in
1951, and he was a law clerk to Supreme Court Justice Sherman
Minton during the Court's October Term 1951. After his
clerkship, Mr. Mikva returned to Illinois, where he entered the
practice of law, becoming a partner of future United States
Supreme Court Justice Arthur Goldberg. Mr. Mikva's practice
included extensive litigation and appellate work, and he
presented several constitutional cases to the Supreme Court. He
started his political career in 1956 in the Illinois House of
Representatives, where he served five consecutive terms. In
1968, Mikva was elected to the United States House of
Representatives. He represented portions of Chicago and its
suburbs, served on both the Ways and Means Committee and the
Judiciary Committee, and was reelected four times. In 1979, he
was appointed a Judge of the United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit. Judge Mikva became chief
judge of the D.C. Circuit in 1991 and continued judicial service
until his retirement in September 1994. He then served as
President Clinton's White House Counsel from October 1, 1994,
until November 1, 1995. Judge Mikva currently is Senior
Director and Visiting Professor at the Edwin F. Mandel Legal
Aid Clinic of the University of Chicago and also engages in
1241
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arbitration and mediation work with JAMS, a national dispute
resolution firm.
James C.N. Paul was born in 1926 in Chestnut Hill,
Pennsylvania. In 1943, he enlisted in the United States Navy
and, after ninety days of training, was commissioned as an
officer. He was posted to the Pacific Theatre, served in the
amphibious forces and after two combat experiences was
promoted to the rank of Lieutenant (j.g.). Returning home in
1946, he received his B.A. degree from Princeton University in
1948 and his J.D. degree from The Law School of the University
of Pennsylvania, where he was Editor-in-Chief of the University
of Pennsylvania Law Review, in 1951. He was one of three law
clerks to Chief Justice of the United States Fred M. Vinson for
two years, during both Supreme Court October Terms 1951 and
1952. Mr. Paul was a law professor at the University of North
Carolina (Chapel Hill) from 1953 until 1955 and then at the
University of Pennsylvania from 1955 until 1963. In 1959,
Professor Paul was awarded an Eisenhower Fellowship to study
prospects for "rule of law" development in various anglophonic
countries in Sub-Sahara Africa. During 1961-63, he served as a
traveling Consultant to the Peace Corps, negotiating special
programs including placements of U.S. lawyers in five African
countries. In 1962, he took a leave from Penn to become, at the
personal invitation of the Emperor Haille Selassie, the founding
Dean of Ethiopia's first University Law School (at HailleSelassie
University, which today is Addis Ababa University). In 1967,
Dean Paul became first the Acting President and then the
Academic Vice President of the University. In 1970, after
receiving a medal from the Emperor for distinguished service,
Dean Paul returned to the United States and became dean of the
Rutgers University Law School in Newark. In 1975, he became
Rutgers's William J. Brennan Professor of Law, working on
human rights law and development issues. During 1991-95, he
served as an active consultant to the Ethiopian Constitutional
Commission and a sometime consultant, on Africa Projects, to
the United Nations Development Programme. After retiring
from Rutgers in 1996, Professor Paul made many trips during
the next five years to Ethiopia and other African counties,
including post-genocide Rwanda, on missions for The Carter
Center. In 2001, he became Ethiopia's nominee to sit on the
[Vol. 82:12391242
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International Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Commission at The
Hague, an international tribunal that arbitrates war claims
arising from their 1998-2000 war, and he still serves in that
capacity. He has authored or co-authored five books-most of
them on "human rights-based approaches to human
development"-plus the usual assortment of law review articles.
Neal Person Rutledge was born in 1927 in St. Louis,
Missouri. His father was Justice Wiley B. Rutledge, Jr.,
President Franklin Roosevelt's final appointee to the Supreme
Court. After attending Haverford College for one year, Neal
Rutledge served in the Marine Corps from 1945 to 1946. He
received his B.A. degree from Harvard University in 1947 and his
J.D. degree from Yale Law School in 1950. He clerked for Judge
Charles Fahy at the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit during 1950-51 and was a law clerk
to Supreme Court Justice Hugo L. Black during the Court's
October Term 1951. After serving with the U.S. Atomic Energy
Commission in Los Alamos, New Mexico, from 1952 to 1953, Mr.
Rutledge entered private practice in Miami with Claude Pepper
Law Offices. He continued to practice in Miami with Faircloth &
Rutledge, and then with Rutledge & Milledge, trying civil and
criminal cases in over half of the states and teaching tort law as
an adjunct professor at the University of Miami School of Law.
From 1970 to 1973, Mr. Rutledge taught law full-time at Duke
University Law School and as an adjunct at North Carolina
Central Law School, an historically black college. He resumed
law practice in 1974 as Of Counsel with Wald, Harkrader & Ross
in Washington, D.C., handling principally federal antitrust trials.
He also litigated Green v. American Tobacco, which produced the
first judicial finding in the United States that smoking cigarettes
caused lung cancer. During his career, Mr. Rutledge argued
approximately ten cases before the U.S. Supreme Court.
Marshall L. Small was born in 1927 in Kansas City,
Missouri. He received his A.B. degree from Stanford University
in 1949 and his J.D. degree from Stanford Law School, where he
was Note Editor of the Stanford Law Review, in 1951. He was
the sole law clerk to Supreme Court Justice William 0. Douglas
during the Court's October Term 1951. From 1952 to 1954, Mr.
Small served on active duty as a 1st Lieutenant in the Office of
1243
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
the Judge Advocate General, Department of the Army, in
Washington, D.C. Following a brief period on the Stanford Law
School faculty as an Acting Assistant Professor of Law, he
associated with Morrison & Foerster in 1954 and was a partner
of the firm from 1961 through 1992, including stints as managing
partner (1971-76) and chair of the firm (1982-84). Since 1993,
he has been Senior Of Counsel to the firm, which during his
career has grown from twenty-three lawyers in San Francisco to
over 1,000 lawyers in nineteen offices throughout the world, and
for the past ten years he has been the firm's General Counsel.
Mr. Small has been engaged in a diversified business practice,
which includes counseling boards of directors, serving as special
counsel to board committees, and handling compensation
arrangements, corporate and other public disclosure matters, and
securities law matters. He is a member of the American Law
Institute and a Fellow of the American Bar Foundation and
served as a Reporter for the ALI's Corporate Governance Project
from 1982 through its completion in 1993. Mr. Small also is a
member of the American Bar Association's Business Law Section
and has served on its Committee on Corporate Laws. He also





To begin, I ask each panelist how he became a
Supreme Court law clerk. Marshall Small, how did
you get this job?
Justice Douglas took his clerks from the Ninth
Circuit-he was Ninth Circuit Justice, out in the
western part of the United States. He did that
because he wanted to give law students from that
area an opportunity to come back and clerk. Most
of the clerks had traditionally come from the
eastern law schools. So the western law schools
nominated candidates to be selected. Justice
Douglas did not select his own clerks. He asked
someone. In my case, it was a former law clerk,
Stanley Sparrowe, who was a private practitioner
in Oakland. He would interview each of us and
then select one. Stanford Law School, which I
attended, nominated me as a candidate and Stan
[Vol. 82:12391244
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Moderator:
Sparrowe selected me, but I did not meet the
Justice until he came back to the Court in late
September 1951, actually, because he usually
stayed late out west and then came back.
Let's work our .way from west coast to east. Judge
Mikva, coming out of Chicago, how did you come to
be a law clerk to Justice Minton?
Judge Mikva: Well, Justice Sherman Minton was the Justice for
the Seventh Circuit, which is the mid-western
circuit, covering Illinois, Indiana and Wisconsin.
He had served in fact on the Court of Appeals in
Chicago before he was appointed to the Supreme
Court. He had traditionally taken his law clerks
from Northwestern University in Chicago or the
University of Indiana, which was his alma mater.
My dean at that time at the University of Chicago
was Edward Levi, who later on became Attorney
General of the United States, but the law school
was going through a transformation under Levi
and he wanted to up it in its national rankings by
getting some clerkships for Chicago alumni, and he
literally camped on Justice Minton's door step until
Minton agreed to pick a candidate-to pick a law
clerk-from the University of Chicago. I'd been
Editor-in-Chief of the Law Review and Levi sent
me out there and I passed the interview and I got a
handwritten note, which I still have from Justice




Let's move to Philadelphia. Charles Hileman, how
did you come to be a clerk with Justice Harold H.
Burton?
Well, Justice Burton was the Justice for the United
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. The
Third Circuit covers Pennsylvania, New Jersey and
Delaware. He always took one of his law clerks
from that circuit. He had a tradition of taking as
his clerk a lawyer who had worked as a law clerk
for Judge Goodrich in the Third Circuit Court of
Appeals. And so Dean Owen Roberts of the
2008] 1245
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University of Pennsylvania Law School called me
into his office-
Moderator: Owen J. Roberts had, by the way, worked his way
up to law school dean from what position?
Hileman: Yes, he worked his way up to dean from being a
Supreme Court Justice-retired. Anyway, he
called me into his office and said he had a proposal
for me, and that is that I would become a clerk for
Judge Goodrich of the Third Circuit and then
Justice Burton would probably hire me as his clerk
for the next year. That's what happened. I had an
interview with Justice Burton, I think it was a
little pro forma, but anyway, he then hired me as
his clerk.
Moderator: The Owen Roberts/University of Pennsylvania Law
School path also was part of your experience, Jim
Paul. How did you come to work for Chief Justice
Fred M. Vinson?
Mr. Paul: Well, it was even simpler than it was for my former
mentor and friend, Charlie Hileman. Owen
Roberts called me in and said Fred Vinson owes me
a favor and I am going to send you down to
Washington to clerk for him. So my clerkship was
a product of extortion, I think. I will add this: I got
down to Washington and tried to figure out a lot of
things to say, questions that the Chief Justice
would ask, and so on. I was ushered into his office.
I found a man who looked a little bit like a tired
Saint Bernard, with big bags under his eyes, you
know, bushy eyebrows. We had a dog sort of like
that in our house. Anyway, he was more than
that; he was, politically, a very experienced person,
sagacious, shrewd, wise, and I felt I was being just
looked over, that I wasn't going to get the third
degree or anything. And after five minutes, he
said, "Well, I guess you'll do." And that was the
sum total of it.
Moderator: Neal Rutledge, you were coming out of the Yale
Law School. How did you come to be Justice Hugo
L. Black's law clerk?
1246 [Vol. 82:1239
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Mr. Rutledge: Why, personal influence. Not by academic
stardom, although I did alright in law school-I
was in the top 20 percent of my class. But my
father was Roosevelt's last appointment to the
Supreme Court, and he had served, of course, with
Justice Black. They were very good friends. I had
learned to know the Justices. I was in high school
growing up and going off to college. I also had
known Judge Charles Fahy, who was solicitor
general when my father was serving on the Court
and they had known each other. And so as a
tribute to my father, an offer came through two of
my professors at Yale Law School, John Frank and
Fowler Harper, saying that, basically, if I took a
couple of courses and if I did alright in them and
they thought I was up to it, that these two judges
had said they would like me to clerk for them on
my graduation. So I spent a year with Judge Fahy
and then the next year with Justice Black and it
was a wonderful opportunity for me because I got
to see from the inside the two courts that my father
had served in.
Moderator: That gets you into this intimate, proximate
confidential relationship. I'd like to hear now
about the boss, the Justice for whom you worked
and what the relationship was like during the
year, or in Jim's case two years, that you were a
law clerk. We'll proceed in the same way.
Marshall, can you tell us about Justice Douglas as
you knew him?
Small: Well, Justice Douglas had a reputation as a kind of
laid-back, casual westerner by reputation in the
public press. But I was cautioned by Stan
Sparrowe not to expect that, to expect a stern
taskmaster who would require me to work very
hard. And that was true. Justice Douglas was a
rather complicated individual. Working with him
on the Court's business across the desk, responding
to his memoranda, he was all business and very
stern and not at all relaxed or jovial. If you got
him outside of that context, either during the
clerkship year or thereafter, he could be quite
amiable and amusing. I think the clerks who
1247
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worked for Douglas generally had that same
experience, some better, some worse, but all that
same way.2
I give one illustration of the jovial side. On the
thirteenth anniversary of his joining the Court, he
had a little cocktail party in chambers just for
those of us who were on staff. He made martinis
the way he used to make them for FDR and told us
about how times were back in the '30s in
Washington where he'd been working. He
remembered I'd grown up in Kansas City,
Missouri, and so he recalled that he had a speaking
engagement there one time and took his dog Frosty
with him and was going to stay at the best hotel in
town. When he got there, the hotel refused to
admit him because he had his dog. So the two of
them ended up in a motel. When the Chamber of
Commerce found out, they were so embarrassed
they sent a case of dog food to Frosty. Douglas said
that thereafter, Frosty would never eat any other
kind of dog food.
Moderator: Neal, please tell us about Justice Black.
Rutledge: Well, Hugo Black-I think we all as law clerks who
where there refer to our Justices as "the boss," and
I did the same with Justice Black. But he of all the
people that I have worked for, from grade school
through seniority, was less of a boss than anybody
I have ever known. You got that feeling right away
as a law clerk with Justice Black. Obviously he
was in charge. He was the Judge. He made the
decisions. But you felt always that you were
working with him rather than for him. This is a
very difficult year, this '51 Term, for Justice Black
because his wife was seriously ill and died during
the Term and he was very devoted to his wife. And
I would have expected on her death that he would
have been considerably less efficient in doing the
chores-particularly the routine chores-of being a
Justice. But every morning he appeared, kept up
2 See generally Marshall L. Small, William 0. Douglas Remembered: A
Collective Memory by WOD's Law Clerks, 32 J. SUP. CT. HIST. 297 (2007).
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his work and it was just marvelous to behold.
Frankly, it was a privilege to know him and to
work with him in his office. It was just a double
privilege.
Moderator: Charlie, what was Justice Burton like, as a boss
and as a personality?
Hileman: Justice Burton was a Senator from Ohio for a good
many years and the desk next to his was taken by
Senator Harry Truman. When Truman became
President and there was a vacancy on the Supreme
Court, he appointed Harold Burton as a Justice.
And Justice Burton was a wonderful man-I guess
all the other law clerks always referred to what a
kind person Justice Burton was. It was really true
of him. He really treated his law clerks like
family-it was a very friendly relationship. Mrs.
Burton and the Justice took Margaret and me to a
play in Alexandria. At their insistence, we had
them to dinner at our apartment in Alexandria,
with our two young daughters. Most of the
Justices had two law clerks. John Douglas was the
other law clerk and his father was Senator Paul
Douglas from Illinois, so that added fun to the job.
Justice Burton took us law clerks and our wives to
a reception held by the President and introduced
us to the President. He did a lot of very nice things
for us. So he was a great Justice to work for.
Moderator: Let me stay on the Senate theme and skip to you,
Judge Mikva. Please tell us about Justice Minton.
Mikva: On the other side of Senator Burton and Senator
Truman was Senator Sherman Minton of Indiana.
Truman used to say those were his two lawyers.
Then after he appointed Harold Burton to the
Court, he appointed Sherman Minton to another
vacancy that occurred. Minton had won one term
as a United States Senator. He was elected in
1934. As he put it, he wasn't really much of a
Democrat at that point. He'd gone down to New
Albany, Indiana, to practice law and the
Republican Party was full-it had too many young,
ambitious lawyers in it. So he became a Democrat
1249
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and got a little active with Roosevelt's election in
'32. And in '34 when a vacancy occurred in the
Senate, the state Democratic chairman asked
Minton to run for the Senate and he did. And of
course he won. As he put it, he won on Franklin
Roosevelt's coattails and he knew it, so when he
got to the Senate, as far as he was concerned,
Roosevelt was the leader and he was a follower and
he was going to be as strong a New Dealer as there
was-and he was. He co-sponsored much of the
important New Deal legislation, co-sponsored the
Court-packing legislation, and co-sponsored other
bills that Roosevelt wanted.
After winning one term, he lost in 1940. Roosevelt
then appointed him to the Court of Appeals. It was
very hard to determine in those days what a
Midwestern Circuit Judge was like because they
didn't have many national cases; they had mostly
cases about parties in Illinois or Indiana. And so
Minton came to the Supreme Court as a Justice
really known as a New Deal Senator and Harry
Truman's seatmate. And lo and behold, when he
got on the Supreme Court, it turned out he was
really quite conservative. He used to explain that
he was elected on Roosevelt's coattails, he knew
what the people expected of him and he did it, but
when he was appointed to the Supreme Court he
was expected to be his own man and he frequently
did things much different than the liberal New
Dealers would have predicted. Minton explained
that even though he was Truman's lawyer and
they were good friends, he did have to go through
the motions when he was proposed to be
nominated. He went over to see Truman at his
request. They were sitting there and Truman had
the World Series on the television. Minton, who
had been a semi-pro baseball player in his youth,
pointed to the player up at bat and he said, "You
know, Mr. President, that fellow can hit a homer
any time he is at bat." At which point the fellow
obligingly hit one out of the park. Truman said,
"Well, Shay, if you can call them that well in the
Court, you will be a heck of a Supreme Court
Justice."
1250 [Vol. 82:1239
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Moderator: How did he treat you?
Mikva: He treated me very well. He was a very kind
person to his clerks. He thought this was a
learning opportunity for us. We used to, with his
encouragement, go watch the proceedings in the
House and the Senate and learn something about
the way the Congress worked. He was concerned
about our careers and our well-being. He never
overworked us and even when he would be
irritated with our expressing views different than
his, it was always civil and jovial and he would
tease us a lot about our being left-wingers, as I
went to the left-wing University of Chicago. He
had a little more trouble with my co-clerk. Ray
Gray went to the University of Indiana, which was
Minton's alma mater. But he'd say, "They got a
new left wing now down in Indiana."
Moderator: Jim Paul, please tell us about Fred Vinson, the
Chief Justice, as your boss.
Paul: Well, I suspect he was a little bit different. His
relationships with his law clerks, at least during
my time with him, were rather formal. We had a
few social events outside the Court. The only
social events that I had to get to know him in a
different view was like Justice Minton. The Chief
Justice was a big ballplayer and fan. He had
played second base at the Centre College baseball
team in Kentucky, the old "Praying Colonels" of
Centre College. And he therefore felt that he too
knew a good deal about the game. And
occasionally one of us, even myself, got summoned
into his office and he said, "I want you to take me
out to Griffith Stadium and watch the Senators
play. '3 Of course the Senators always lost in those
days but that was sort of a different experience.
In preparing for this meeting, I did go through
David McCullough's biography of President
3 Griffith Stadium, the home of the Washington Senators, was located at the
corner of Georgia Avenue and W Street N.W. It was demolished in 1965.
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Truman.4 I did that because Chief Justice Vinson
was an extraordinary friend of Harry Truman.
Harry Truman admired him greatly for all his
political talents-as a congressman for twenty-two
years, he served in the Roosevelt administration
and briefly on the Court of Appeals, came back as
Treasury Secretary under Truman. The Chief
really liked that position. For the record, John, I
am holding my fingers together, I did find quotes-
this is what Truman said of Vinson: "He is a
completely devoted patriot with a sense of personal
loyalty seldom found among Washington's top
men." That says a lot, I think, if one knows
Washington. And then again it sort of may seem
strange to us today, but the President and Chief
Justice Vinson loved to play poker. McCullough
says that Truman was a "loose" player who liked to
be in the pot but sometimes shouldn't have been
there. Vinson, on the other hand, was an expert
and that was also something that Truman admired
greatly. Also, a story is reported that one evening
they were sipping away on their bourbon, and this
time they were playing blackjack, Truman was
dealing and Vinson drew a ten, and the other card,
he needed-just one card more-not too high-
anything below a queen would help him win this
pot, which apparently was pretty big, and Truman
dealt him the queen of spades, and he was out.
And the Chief exploded and said, "Why you son-of-
a-bitch." And then he said, "Excuse me, Mr.
President." I guess that shows something of the
relationship.
I want to close this by saying I once sent a book
that I had written to Truman-I won't talk about
the book except it was about history in the politics
in the Jacksonian period;5 I knew Truman was a
great fan of Andrew Jackson as President, in fact
that he used Jackson as a model, and I thought
that this book at least was relevant to his
interests. And he wrote back and thanked me and
all that stuff, but when he wound up he said, "I
4 See DAVID MCCULLOUGH, TRUMAN (1992).
, See JAMES C.N. PAUL, RIFT IN THE DEMOCRACY (1951).
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hope you have a grand tour with the Chief Justice.
I don't know a finer man." All of that, to me, just
epitomized his admiration for Vinson; he liked to
be a folksy politician, yet underneath he was
terribly shrewd and knew what he wanted and
often got people to do it.
Moderator: We are going to move in a moment to some of the
cases, but first I would like you to compare
notes on how the Justice actually used you-what
work did you do, what were the employment
expectations, for you as law clerks? How did you
keep busy day to day?
Mikva: I'll start because they are all so reluctant. Justice
Minton was not an early bird. He would come in
about 9:30 or so. And frequently if we got up early
enough, I would be able to get in a round of golf
with two of Jim's co-clerks, Howard Trienens and
Newt Minow. We would go out there and be back
by 9:00 and be hard at work when my Justice came
in, and I guess when the Chief came in as well.
Once there, we didn't have that much interchange.
There were certain things that Justice Minton
expected very much for the clerks to do. One was
to do the so-called cert memos. You get a case to
the United States Supreme Court by filing a
petition for certiorari-in shorthand it's "cert."
And the clerks, at least in Minton's office, would
write memos to the Justice as to why we thought
that certiorari should be granted or not be granted.
Unless certiorari is granted, the case isn't heard by
the Supreme Court. You need at least four votes to
grant certiorari, and only then is the case taken
and heard. We would write these memos that took
a good part of the time during the summer and
early fall, writing memos on all the cert petitions
that were filed. He would look them over and he'd
always agree with us if we recommend that cert
not be granted. He thought the Court shouldn't
hear too many cases. The Chief Justice had a
special arrangement where he could put cases on
the "dead list," which meant that they were not
going to be discussed in Conference unless one of
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the Justices asked to take it off. And Justice
Minton didn't want to even consider the cases that
were on the dead list. As far as he was concerned,
if the Chief Justice said, "We don't need to consider
this case," that was good enough for Justice
Minton.
Moderator: Did each of you also perform this screening
function by writing cert memos?
Hileman: Justice Burton had two clerks, John Douglas and
me. And we did every other cert petition. We'd
write a short memo telling him what the case was
about and our recommendation as to whether he
should vote in favor of taking the case or not.
Moderator: Once the Justices meet in the Conference and
decide what cases they are going to take, and the
cases are being fully briefed and they are heading
for oral argument, did you have tasks that were
part of getting your Justice ready for that next
phase in the process?
Rutledge: I remember being tremendously impressed very
quickly as a law clerk for Justice Black at the
difference in the perspective from the Supreme
Court from the perspective in the U.S. Court of
Appeals. Now the United States Court of Appeals
in Washington, D.C., as Chief Judge Mikva can
testify, has a particularly special place because it
gets a lot of federal government cases that wouldn't
appear in the other ten circuits in the country. So
it's a very interesting place to work. But most of
the cases come to the Supreme Court-and this
just staggered me-by way of a writ of certiorari,
which is a discretionary writ. You apply to the
Court and it can be either from a state court or
from a federal appellate court. Actually it can even
be from a trial court in unusual circumstances.
You apply for this writ and then it's entirely at the
discretion of the Court whether to take the case or
not. If the Court decides not to take it, there is no
precedent so far as the Court is concerned. But
what we had in our chambers-Black's chambers-
was every Monday morning, this cart would be
[Vol. 82:12391254
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rolled in by Spencer and it was just loaded
practically to the ceiling with these petitions for
cert from state courts all over the country and from
the federal courts. The volume was just
tremendous and we would divide that-Sam
Daniels and I were the two law clerks--down the
middle and it took us the better part of a week to
write memos on each case as to whether we
thought the Judge should vote to take the case or
should not. So a great deal of our work was on the
certiorari end.
Moderator: In the oral argument phase, what were the
responsibilities and the involvements of the clerks?
Small: Well, unlike the other Justices, Justice Douglas did
not ask for what they call a bench memo to be
prepared when cases were sent down for oral
argument. Our main job was on the cert petitions
that has been described, except one thing was a
little bit different-Justice Douglas only had one
clerk traditionally through a large part of his time
on the bench and he was the longest serving
Justice in the history of the Court, over thirty-five
years. Most of that time he only carried one clerk.
The year before I was there he experimented with
two and then went back to one and continued. In
later years he started to take two, and then three
but of course by then the business of the Court had
just increased exponentially in terms of the
numbers of cert petitions filed and in order to keep
up with it he really needed more clerks. At some
point a number of the Justices got together and
formed what they called the cert pool, in which one
clerk from one office would write the memo-a cert
memo-for all the offices participating, but Justice
Douglas never would do that. He felt that the
Court really should operate so that each Justice
would look at things himself, now herself. And
another thing that was different in the Douglas
chambers was that a number of cases were filed
which were called in forma pauperis cases. These
were traditionally filed by prisoners who had some
claim of constitutional deprivation and were asking
for relief. A lot of those cases were frivolous and
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the typical practice was to put them on this so-
called dead list and that was usually the
responsibility of the Chief Justice's clerks to do
that. But again, Justice Douglas felt everybody
deserved to have a look, even the in forma pauperis
petitions, and so he had his clerks look at all the
petitions as well and let him know whether there
were any petitions that warranted his attention, to
make sure that justice was done. So we were busy
in those chambers. We didn't do the bench memos
but we did do lots of other things that kept us
occupied.
Mikva: We did bench memos for Justice Minton. After cert
was granted in a case, he wanted a detailed bench
memo on what we thought the major arguments
were and indeed even a recommendation note as to
how we thought he ought to vote on the merits of
the case in Conference. (He felt free to ignore
those when necessary.) And they were expected to
be much more detailed. In the cert petitions,
sometimes a memo could be very short: "This is a
frivolous case. Denied." But in a bench memo, he
expected us to put in all the cases and all the
precedents that might possibly decide the question.
Then when he would be on the bench, of course, it
was traditional that the clerks for all the Justices
had to be there while the cases are being argued-
we had these little crevices over on the side where
we could sit and listen to arguments. And at least
once a day, a note would come over from Justice
Minton: "Can you find the case of so and so?"
Either my co-clerk or I would run back to the
chambers and tear all the books off the shelves-
we didn't have computers in those days. And of
course we could never find the case he was
remembering. We used to call it a "Justice Minton
NO case"-and we found a lot of "NO" cases.
Moderator: Let's move into the cases. 1951 to 1952-the last
year of the Truman administration; the depths of
the Cold War; the Red Scare/McCarthy era-
brought cases involving those issues to the Court.
Let me begin with you, Charlie. The Sacher case
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was one momentous case. Please tell us what that
was about and how you recall it.
Hileman: The Sacher case was on petition for cert from a
decision involving the New York Communist case.
There were eleven avowed party leaders-
Communists-who were tried for violation of the
Smith Act, which is conspiring to overthrow the
government of the United States by force or
violence. There were cases like that all around the
country, and the New York case was the first one.
There were eleven defendants and each defendant
had a lawyer and the trial lasted six months.
Throughout the course of the trial, the judge and
the lawyers were constantly involved in battle
between each other. The judge threatened to hold
them in contempt but he didn't. But at the end of
the trial after six months, all of the defendants
were found guilty, as they were in all those
communist cases. He asked the six lawyers to
stand up and he said, "I am citing you for contempt
of court. And I have list of contemptuous acts...,"
going twenty pages long or something, and he
didn't give the lawyers a chance to say anything
and he said, "I find you all guilty of contempt."
And he imposed prison sentences for all of them up
to six months. Well, they appealed that to the
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit and it
affirmed those contempt citations. They were
totally separate from the guilt of the defendants, so
they had their own separate appeals. The
Supreme Court granted certiorari in that case and
the question was whether the judge properly held
them in contempt. The only issue before the
Supreme Court was whether the judge properly did
that himself-that is, he charged them with
contempt of court, and then he decided himself
they were all guilty, even though most of the
contempt was against him personally, the alleged
contempt. And then he sentenced them. And the
question was whether that was proper to do that or
whether he should have called on another judge to
decide that question. That was the only question
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before the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court,
much to my chagrin, affirmed the convictions.
6
Moderator: Did you argue with Justice Burton about how you
would vote in that case?
Hileman: That is one of the many times maybe when I
argued with him, because Justice Burton was a
conservative Republican and John Douglas and I
were both liberal-civil libertarians. So I argued
that what Judge Medina did was an outrage.
There was no reason at the end of the trial for him
to do all this himself and it appeared unfair for him
to be the judge and the jury in his own accusation.
Moderator: And the executioner. So much for the input of law
clerks, right?
Judge Mikva, let me turn to you. Adler, the
Feinberg Act case, may be a cousin of the Sacher
case.
Mikva: It was. It involved the teacher oath in New York
City. You have to remember, this is the height of
the McCarthy era. It wasn't that the Russians
were coming as much we were convinced that there
was this domestic conspiracy that's going to
undermine our institutions by teaching kids to be
communists, and singing communist songs by Paul
Robeson and other terrible things like that that
have to be outlawed. And New York required that
teachers take an oath swearing that they were not
communists or they wouldn't be allowed to teach in
the schools. One teacher or principal by the name
of Adler refused to sign the oath. His or her case
came all the way up to the Supreme Court. And
both my co-clerk and I thought it was outrageous.
First of all, we have a strong tradition in this
country against oaths-even the Constitution
speaks against oaths.7 The idea that a teacher who
clearly was acting on principles and wasn't a
communist would be denied the right to teach
6 See Sacher v. United States, 343 U.S. 1 (1952).
7 See U.S. CONST., art. VI, cl. 3.
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because of this law offended us. We had
recommended that cert be granted but other than
that we tried to keep our views, when we
recognized that wasn't where he was, to ourselves.
Sherman Minton, who like Justice Burton was very
conservative on these issues, came back from the
Conference and said, "Well, I've been assigned to
write the Adler case. Here's what I want you to
do." And it was going to be my turn to write the
opinion, the first draft anyway, so I was taking
copious notes, trying to do it exactly the way he
thought it ought to be done. I wrote a draft and
sent it in to him and the next day he came
storming into our office, saying, "God damn left
wing University of Chicago. I should have known
better." And he took the opinion from me and
handed it to my co-clerk, Ray Gray, who was from
Indiana. But Gray was far to the left of me and
when he took over the opinion, he ended up with
many more things that obviously displeased
Justice Minton. Finally Minton took the opinion
and ignored everything that Ray Gray and I had
suggested and wrote the opinion by himself with
his secretary and circulated it. I remember that
even the Justices who agreed with him were very
upset with the way it had been written. So that
while we didn't have the power to influence the
decisions, maybe we did have some influence on
trying to make the decision consistent with other
things the Court had been saying. But it ended up
the law of the land and if anyone wants to take a
look at it, you'll find an opinion that did not do very
much by way of shedding light-but it shed a lot of
heat.8
Moderator: Another very significant case in this Term of the
Court involving schools and involving value
inculcation was called Zorach v. Clauson.9 It was
about release time from the public schools that
would allow students to be recipients of religious
instruction. Marshall, tell us about Zorach and
how you remember that case.
8 Adler v. Bd. of Educ., 342 U.S. 485 (1952).
9 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
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Small: Well, as you say, that was a case that had a
program set up to allow students to leave the
public school and attend religious instruction off
premises, presumably at a local religious
institution. And Douglas took the position, which
frankly I thought was defensible, and frankly I
agreed with it, that that wasn't an establishment
of religion and that the state ought to be free to
permit that sort of arrangement. I was troubled by
some of the language in his opinion, which I called
to his attention and we had a frank discussion on it
and he did make changes in the opinion as it
finally was circulated. But there were bitter
dissents from some of the other Justices who didn't
agree with that result. Justice Douglas's own
views were modified over the years and he came to,
I think in some respects, take the views of some of
the dissenters in Zorach. I think that was simply
an example of a situation where you had a sitting
Justice who was on the Court as long as he was,
whose views evolved and changed over time on a
particular issue, although on some issues that he
had a particular compass that he followed
throughout his career.
Moderator: Let me ask about one final area in this segment of
our program. Brown v. Board of Education,10 the
question of school segregation, came to the Court
in the next two Terms, in the '52 Term and in the
'53 Term, culminating in the Brown decision in
May 1954. But a string of segregation cases had
been in the Court in the years following World War
II and school segregation is before the Justices in
some preliminary ways while you are law clerks.
What do you recall of that issue?
Rutledge: Well, the school segregation issue was a prominent
one, all during the period that my father had
served on the Court-he went on in '43, he died in
'49. Here we are in '51, but the earlier cases
started out, so to speak, from the top down and
they involved rich kids' law schools. There were
10 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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many southern states that had no law school that a
black man could go to and some of those states
would send a black man that wanted to go to law
school (and was qualified to), they would pay his
expenses and send him up north. And he would
end up at the University of Illinois or Michigan or
somewhere like that.
Moderator: The Court had marched through that. I like the
downward idea-the law schools, the graduate
schools. Now we are talking elementary and
secondary schools. Where were the Justices on
that in '51 and '52?
Rutledge: I can't tell you where the Justices on the Court
were on that. All I can tell you is that for Black,
who was from Alabama and was the most southern
of anybody on the Court, his view, as far as I could
tell it on that, was that this was a dynamite kind of
a case which would have political ramifications and
which would stir the entire country up. But he was
personally in favor of enforcing the same kind of
law at the elementary school level and the high
school level that the Court had already pretty well
established at the college level and the law school
level.
Hileman: Up to that point, the Supreme Court had always
taken the position that it was alright for a school
district to put the black children in one school and
the white children in another school as long as they
were equal. So the rule was "separate but equal."
And the cases all involved a question whether the
black schools were equal. But the Brown v. Board
of Education case was brought up in a way in
which the Court couldn't decide it that way-it had
to either decide whether the school could be
segregated or not. But the Supreme Court decided
not to hear the case in our Term. So we really
didn't get into discussion of that case on the merits.
Mikva: An interesting story that at least Marshall Small
and I remembered is that there was a tradition of
inviting a Supreme Court Justice down to lunch
with the clerks. We had our own separate dining
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room so that we could talk about the cases and not
be overheard by lawyers who wanted to know what
was going on. And we would invite one Justice
down each week to talk to us about what was going
on.
One week we invited Justice Frankfurter down. It
was just about this time of the year, May, and one
of the desegregation cases had been argued in that
Term. I don't remember what it was-I think it
was a South Carolina case 1-and clearly no
opinions were being circulated. So it was clear the
Court wasn't going to decide the case that year
because if they heard it in the fall, certainly the
drafts of opinions are circulating among the
Justices by May. And one of the clerks had the
temerity to ask Justice Frankfurter, who was our
guest, "Mr. Justice why isn't the Court going to
come down with a decision in the desegregation
case?" This is 1952, May of '52. Frankfurter looked
at us as if we were all wet-behind-the-ears recent
law school graduates, which we were, and he said,
"Why, don't you realize this is a social revolution
we're talking about. You really want us to come
down with a case like that in an election year?"
We all gasped in horror at the idea that the Court
even knew when the election was, let alone would
consider when to hand down cases based on the
election date. I remember one of Justice
Frankfurter's clerks, Abe Chayes, was looking for a
hole in the ground that he could fall into and not be
there, he was so embarrassed. Then the same
clerk followed up with, "Mr. Justice, we don't
understand. What does that have to do with
whether the case should be decided or not?"
Frankfurter explained to us the politics of it.
"Here you've got these two candidates running for
President, Eisenhower and Adlai Stevenson.
Neither one will read the opinion but they'll come
down on different sides of it. One will oppose it,
one be for it. Is that the way you want this
important case to be put into the public arena?"
" See Briggs v. Elliott, 342 U.S. 350 (1952).
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Well, I was a Stevenson Democrat and I like to
think he would have read the opinion. I think he
would have come out for it. President Eisenhower
made it very clear later on, privately anyway, that
he was very much opposed to the decision in Brown
v. Board of Education. But if he had expressed
himself publicly in the campaign saying he was
opposed to it, what would have happened at Little
Rock, where the only way that the decision was
enforced and the peace was kept was because
President Eisenhower called out the troops to keep
the peace in Little Rock, Arkansas? Perhaps he
would have said then, if he had made it an issue in
the national campaign and been elected anyway,
which he would have been, what President Jackson
once said-"The Supreme Court has got its decree,
let them enforce it"-which would have been a
disaster for the country. So over the years I began
to think that Justice Frankfurter maybe had more
sense than I thought he had when I was twenty-
five.
Small: That report is essentially as I recall it. But I think
at the time of that luncheon, we didn't know
specifically who the nominees were going to be
because neither of the parties had had their
convention, although I think there was speculation
that it might well be Eisenhower and Stevenson.
So just a minor footnote.
Paul: Well, I just wanted to say one thing. First of all, I
am very appreciative that this vast audience could
listen to these garrulous octogenarians reminisce,
or make up stories, or Lord knows what we are
doing. But in the school segregation cases, I think
the primary lesson to think about here is that the
cases required that the Court overrule a precedent
that had been well-established many years ago and
followed and never really challenged until these
cases came up in the 1950s. Of course, a vastly
changed context existed when the Plessy v.
Ferguson "separate but equal" case was decided. 2
12 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
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Moderator:
Moderator:
But one reason why it is interesting today is
because it raises the question which I think a lot of
people have thought about-under what
circumstances should the Court overrule a well-
established precedent? And we have that problem
obviously coming up at some point in time, I think,
if the Court confronts Roe v. Wade.13 It at least is
provoking to think: well, what is the difference in
Roe v. Wade and Plessy if the majority of the Court
feels it was the wrong decision when it was made?
I just wanted to call that to your attention. It may
be obvious.
It is a wonderful and provocative thought, and
beyond our format to answer here. Please join me
in thanking the panel for the first part of this
program. We will now take a five minute recess
and then resume with Professor Ken Gormley
leading a discussion of the Steel Seizure Cases.
For those in the audience who are not familiar with
the Steel Seizure Cases," let me just give you this
much background:
In April 1952, President Harry Truman made a
decision that would forever haunt his presidency.
The steel companies and the Steelworkers' unions
were at an impasse. There was about to be a strike
of over 600,000 steelworkers, which President
Truman feared would cripple production of steel
necessary for efforts in the Korean War. So
President Truman made a bold decision. He
ordered his Secretary of Commerce, Charles
Sawyer, to seize the nation's steel mills to keep
them running. In an address on April 8, Truman
said our national security and our chances of peace
depend on our defense production and our defense
production depends on steel.
13 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
14 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
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The response to this action by President Truman
was swift and negative. The Chicago Daily News
called it "leaping socialism." The New York Daily
News said "Hitler and Mussolini would have loved
this." The Washington Post wrote, "President
Truman's seizure of the steel industry will
probably go down in history as one of the most
high-handed acts committed by an American
President."
The United States Supreme Court swiftly granted
certiorari in this case and held that President
Truman had exceeded his powers under the
Constitution. This definitive 6-3 decision in the
Youngstown Sheet & Tube v. Sawyer case
amounted to a stern rebuke of President Truman
at the end of his presidency. It also became the
granddaddy of the Supreme Court decisions
dealing with presidential power, and it is one that
is still very relevant today.
15
In late November 2002, I had the privilege of
organizing a program, co-hosted by Duquesne
University and the Harry S. Truman Library and
Institute, celebrating the 50th anniversary of the
case and bringing together many of the people
involved in it. 16 As part of that program, Chief
Justice William H. Rehnquist, who as a young man
was a law clerk for Justice Robert H. Jackson at
the Supreme Court and a co-clerk of these men,
was gracious enough to provide an interview,
filmed in Washington, D.C., in early November
2002, to begin that program. It is fitting today
that we begin this segment with some of that
15 See generally MAEVA MARCUS, TRUMAN AND THE STEEL SEIZURE CASE: THE
LIMITS OF PRESIDENTIAL POWER (1977; republished 1994); Patricia L. Bellia, The
Story of the Steel Seizure Case, in PRESIDENTIAL POWER STORIES 233-85
(Christopher H. Schroeder & Curtis A. Bradley eds., 2009).
16 See Steel Seizure Symposium Issue, 41 DUQ. L. REV. 665-755 (publishing
comments, discussion, articles and correspondence by David E. Feller, Ken Gormley,
Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, Milton Kayle, Ken Hechler, Stanley Temko,
Maeva Marcus, John Q. Barrett and Clifton Truman Daniel).
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Moderator: Good afternoon, Chief Justice Rehnquist. On
behalf of everyone assembled at Duquesne
University in Pittsburgh, as well as the Harry S.
Truman Presidential Museum and Library that is
co-sponsoring this event, I'd like to thank you for
participating in this special program.
I have just a few questions to set the stage as we
begin this retrospective, looking back fifty years in
history. You were just a 27-year-old law clerk,
clerking for Justice Jackson only a few months in
Washington, at the time the Steel Seizure Case
landed in the courts. At the time, was this a case
everyone expected would be a constitutional
landmark? What was the atmosphere surrounding
it?
C.J. Rehnquist: The atmosphere, so far as one living in
Washington was concerned, was very much that it
would. The law clerks talked and talked about it
at lunch and it wasn't just the Supreme Court
arguments in the case that received press
coverage. The arguments before Judge Pine in the
District Court were front page news in the
Washington papers, perhaps not elsewhere.
Moderator:
Rehnquist:
And did you and your fellow law clerks have any
prediction what would be the final outcome when it
worked its way through the Supreme Court?
Oh, I don't think most of us knew what position
our Justices would take. We did have a vote at
lunch one day and I think, as I recall, we were
evenly divided. But that was not on the basis of
17 See id. at 681-83.
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what we thought our Justices would do, because
most of us didn't know.
And what do you remember most vividly about the
oral argument? I believe it was May 12, 1952.
Well, the fact that John W. Davis argued for over
an hour and I think was asked only one question.
He had a style of advocacy that you don't hear
nowadays, but it was very impressive. And then
Solicitor General Perlman got a whole bunch of
questions from the Court.
And Arthur Goldberg participated as well?
Yes, he participated in oral argument for the AFL-
CIO, I believe.
For the Steelworkers, yes. And in your book on the
Supreme Court, you tell a wonderful story about
the Justices' Conference that Friday, which they
voted on the case in private.'" What do you
remember about that?
Well, as I say, of course the clerks weren't present
in the Conference. But George Niebank, my co-
clerk, and I were just dying to find out what
happened, as I suspect all the other clerks were
too. So we followed Justice Jackson into his office
when he got back, just as we always did. He would
tell us what happened at Conference. And he said,
"Well, boys, the President got licked."
And Justice Jackson's concurring opinion in the
Steel Seizure Case is generally regarded by
Constitutional scholars as the most significant.
What did he say about presidential powers and
why did he write separately?
Well, I think he wrote separately because almost
everybody did write separately. I think the
opinions had to be prepared in a fairly short time,
"s See WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, THE SUPREME COURT 151-92 (2001); WILLIAM
H. REHNQUIST, THE SUPREME COURT: How IT WAS, How IT Is 41-98 (1987).
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and I think even those who agreed with Justice
Black's outcome felt that there needed to be more
said about the thing. And Justice Jackson's
concurring opinion classified presidential power in
three different ways. First, where he acted with
the approval of Congress. There, Jackson said,
"Only if the whole government is disabled does he
lose." Second, where he is acting without
Congressional authorization but without
Congressional disapproval. There it is kind of a
middle ground. And finally, what Jackson felt had
happened in the Steel Seizure Case: where he was
acting in an area where Congress said, "Don't do
what you want to do. You do something else." And
there he said the power is at its nadir.19
Moderator: Right. And did public opinion, do you think,
influence the Court's ultimate decision that
19 See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635-38 (1952)
(Jackson, J., concurring) (footnotes omitted):
We may well begin by a somewhat over-simplified grouping of practical
situations in which a President may doubt, or others may challenge, his
powers, and by distinguishing roughly the legal consequences of this factor
of relativity.
1. When the President acts pursuant to an express or implied
authorization of Congress, his authority is at its maximum, for it
includes all that he possesses in his own right plus all that Congress
can delegate.... A seizure executed by the President pursuant to an
Act of Congress would be supported by the strongest of presumptions
and the widest latitude of judicial interpretation, and the burden of
persuasion would rest heavily upon any who might attack it.
2. When the President acts in absence of either a congressional grant
or denial of authority, he can only rely upon his own independent
powers, but there is a zone of twilight in which he and Congress may
have concurrent authority, or in which its distribution is uncertain.
Therefore, congressional inertia, indifference or quiescence may
sometimes, at least as a practical matter, enable, if not invite,
measures on independent presidential responsibility. In this area, any
actual test of power is likely to depend on the imperatives of events
and contemporary imponderables rather than on abstract theories of
law.
3. When the President takes measures incompatible with the
expressed or implied will of Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb, for
then he can rely only upon his own constitutional powers minus any
constitutional powers of Congress over the matter.... Presidential
claim to a power at once so conclusive and preclusive must be
scrutinized with caution, for what is at stake is the equilibrium
established by our constitutional system.
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President Truman had exceeded his constitutional
power?
I think it did. The government made some
extraordinary claims at the very beginning, in the
District Court, that the President had all the
authority that George III had unless it was taken
from him by the Constitution. Well, you can
imagine the press outcry about this. I mean, it just
made headlines. And it just gave a negative
aspect. The government abandoned that argument
long before it got to the Supreme Court, but it just
got the government off on the wrong foot.
And there was ambivalence about the Korean War
even at that point, wasn't there?
Very much so. There were people fighting and
dying in Korea but very few sacrifices called for on
the home front. World War I- Rather, World War
II-I'm not that old; World War II-you know you
had 14 million people under arms but a lot of
things restricted on the home front. The Korean
War, you just didn't have those restrictions on the
home front, so there was just a real ambivalence,
as you say.
Yes. And what would you say is the lasting
significance of the Steel Seizure Case as we look
back in constitutional history fifty years?
Well, I think the subsequent opinions of the Court
have adopted Justice Jackson's concurrence, and
that kind of trifurcation is probably its
contribution. I think people have expressed the
view that had it come up in time of declared war, it
might have come out differently. And so, you
know, it is just one of many cases in this area, but I
think the Jackson concurrence has been pretty
much what it stood for.
I'm reminded that one of the great things about a
retrospective like this is it allows us to learn
history from key people who actually participated
in it, so your recollections are particularly relevant
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and meaningful. And it puts us in a good position
now to step back a half century and examine a
presidential decision that's really largely been lost
to history books and law books but is still highly
relevant. So thank you very much, Chief Justice
Rehnquist, for introducing today's program.
It has been a pleasure to be here, Professor
Gormley.
Thank you very much. I think you can get a sense
even from that brief recap by Chief Justice
Rehnquist how monumental this decision was at
the time. We're now fortunate to have with us five
other law clerks from the Supreme Court Term of
that year to discuss the significance of the Steel
Seizure Case. It was important then and also, as
we'll discuss, is important even today with respect
to the full issue of presidential power. I want to
start with your recollections, as Chief Justice
Rehnquist mentioned, about the argument, with
John W. Davis, famous Supreme Court lawyer,
once a candidate for president, and Arthur
Goldberg, later on the Supreme Court,
representing the unions. What do you remember
about it, Jim?
Well, I remember John W. Davis because, I
suppose for an older generation, he was really a
role model. After all, he was a man who had run
for president. Of course he lost miserably but he
campaigned with dignity. And then he had been
Solicitor General and held many other public
positions and was sort of dean of the bar. He was
also earning a hell of a lot of money on Wall Street.
He made, as Bill already said, a very impressive
argument. I'm not sure whether he got one
question or no questions, but obviously the Justices
were reluctant on that score. What I remember
most is his dramatic finish. He was up on his feet,
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and he said, quoting Jefferson, "In questions of
power let no more be said of confidence in man, but
bind him down from mischief by the chains of the
Constitution."20  And he pulled out a big
handkerchief, which I don't have, and dabbed his
eyes with it and sat down.
And one thing more: I may be wrong on this, but I
was looking at the Chief Justice, my boss, and his
mouth was making some words. I figure he was
making two one-syllable words-two different one-
syllable words. You can guess what they might
have been.
Mikva: Well, you have to remember, we were all in our
mid-twenties. Our recollections now are probably
somewhat reshaped and restructured, but then
they were never tempered by judgment-at least
mine weren't. I thought I knew it all, and I could
tell what my eyes saw and my ears heard. I saw
this very crotchety old gentleman. He had to be at
least seventy years old-way over the hill-making
this argument. I could barely hear him, sitting off
on the side there, and Court was very respectful,
and I say they're not paying any attention to an
important question, they're just revering his age,
and revering the things he had done in the past,
but he's really much too old to make this important
argument. Seventy-my goodness!
And on the other hand, Solicitor General
Perlman-who as I recall was second; I think
Arthur Goldberg argued last, at least that is the
way I remember it-got up and he was a very
forceful, vigorous Solicitor General, but he was
very troubled by the question. I had a feeling that
he really didn't have his heart set on what
President Truman wanted to do and it was more
like a professorial lecture except there was a lot of
hand-waving about-"well, on the one hand," "on
20 Oral Argument Transcript, Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Charles Sawyer,
(Nos. 744 & 745), May 12, 1952, reprinted in 48 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS
OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 879, 900
(Philip B. Kurland & Gerhard Casper eds., 1975) [hereinafter LANDMARK BRIEFS].
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the other hand"-and he didn't seem forceful
enough about it.
Arthur Goldberg, who was given, as I recall, five
minutes of argument compared to John W. Davis's
hour and Perlman's whatever, was arguing on
behalf of the Steelworkers and he was then in his
prime-early forties, late thirties. He bounced up
there with vigor. In five minutes, it seems he laid
out exactly why President Truman's position ought
to be upheld, which is where my boss was anyway,
and I became so enamored with Goldberg's
argument that I made up my mind right then and
there that I wanted to work for him. And I did.
Moderator: Neal Rutledge, you clerked for Justice Black. He
wrote the majority opinion, although Justice
Jackson's opinion, as we heard in the video, is
considered the most famous today. Did you talk to
Justice Black about your views on this case?
Rutledge: Yes, this case zoomed up at the end of the Term. It
went before the District Court. The District Court
enjoined the seizure. The U.S. Court of Appeals
stayed that injunction but they didn't have a
chance to actually hear the full oral argument or
decide anything more in the case. And then the
Supreme Court granted cert right away. So it
came up in a matter of weeks. And everybody
knew that it was a very important case. It was
going to be extremely important. We were at war.
I know we were at war because a very good friend
of mine got shot and lost his right leg within
months of this happening over in Korea. And we
were fighting a war. We were in as much of a war
then as we are now. I think the clerks particularly
were aware of this. Anyway, the case came up and
was decided by the Court and is- I am not sure,
but it may have been Justice Jackson who
described Black's opinion for the majority as "the
lowest common denominator." And it was that.
This was a constitutional issue that came up very
fast and almost every judge that considered the
case wrote-there were seven different opinions.
One reason Black wrote the majority opinion,
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which the audience may not realize, is that if the
Chief Justice when they vote on a case is in the
majority, he decides who will write the opinion for
the Court-he may assign it to himself or he may
assign it to any of the other judges who are voting
with the majority. If he is in the dissent, as he was
in this case, then the next senior Justice takes on
that role. Well, Black was the next senior Justice.
Moderator: What were the salient points of his position? Why
did he conclude that the President had exceeded
his powers?
Rutledge: He concluded that Congress had acted in this area
repeatedly, that there were basically three
statutes. The Taft-Hartley Act was one of them.
The Selective Service Act had a provision. And the
Defense Production Act. All had provisions that
applied at least in part to this kind of a problem
and none of them provided for the kind of a seizure
that Truman had done. Black, who had served in
the United States Senate for many years, had
great deference for the legislative power of
Congress. It was his feeling-I disagreed with him
and argued with him-that since Congress had
acted in this, the President had to follow whatever
Congress had prescribed. And he so wrote here is
this book, which contains all the decisions from the
Term that we served, this '51 term. The decision
in this case consumes about 100 pages here.
Moderator: It is 131 pages long plus an appendix.
Rutledge: Exactly. Black's majority opinion for the Court,
which four people did concur in, is about three or
four pages long. It is very brief, simply saying the
President does not have any congressional power.
Moreover, Congress has acted in this field. He has
acted contrary to what Congress has prescribed.
He therefore has acted beyond the powers that he
enjoys.
Moderator: Marshall Small, you clerked for Justice Douglas,
who was also in the majority. This case, as we
mentioned, came up very rapidly through the
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courts. How did that impact just the way this was
handled in the courts and by the government?
Small: Well the government did not really have much
time to prepare its briefs and I have to think that
that had some effect on the Court. There was one
decision, the Midwest Oil Case,21 that Felix
Frankfurter presented to John W. Davis in
argument that would have been in the
government's favor and that Davis had actually
argued as Solicitor General back in 1915, I think,
and he said, "Well now you're arguing the
opposite." The government didn't have that case in
its brief. Whether it took Davis by surprise or not,
he handled it very gracefully in trying to explain it
away, which I think was a testament to his
abilities as an advocate. But I think it underscored
the fact that the government had not taken time,
maybe didn't have the time, to carefully consider
the nuances involved in determining what kind of
powers a President should have in this kind of
setting. They really took a rather meat-ax
approach that, you know, he had whatever power
he needed, and I think that bothered the Justices.
The Conference notes-their discussions of the
case after oral argument-tend to underscore some
of that.2 2 They were concerned with the position
that the government had taken and for that reason
felt they needed to do something to respond to it.
They might have, under some circumstances, tried
to avoid taking the case at all. There was some
argument about not even taking the case, but
because the President's power had been put forth
in such bold fashion I suspect they felt they needed
to do something to respond.
Moderator: It wasn't simply a question of how the government
presented the case, was it? Harry Truman hated
21 United States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U.S. 459 (1915).
22 See generally THE SUPREME COURT IN CONFERENCE (1940-1985): THE
PRIVATE DISCUSSIONS BEHIND NEARLY 300 SUPREME COURT DECISIONS 168-82 (Del
Dickson ed., 2001) [hereinafter THE SUPREME COURT IN CONFERENCE (1940-1985)]
(reconstructing the Conference based on Justices' notes).
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the Taft-Hartley Act. It was anathema to the
unions and so he was not going to use it, even
thought he had it available. And you have the fact
that he was at the rock bottom of popularity at
that point.
Small: All that was true and I think that probably also
had something to do with the Court's approach.
Congress had said, "Here's an approach you can
take. You don't need to use uncharted presidential
power. And therefore use Taft-Hartley." As you
say, he had vetoed Taft-Hartley; he didn't want to
use it. An interesting aftermath: When the Court
came down and said, "Sorry, you were wrong," he
then asked Congress to give him authority without
having to use Taft-Hartley. Congress came back
and said, "No, use Taft-Hartley." He still refused
to use Taft-Hartley. Finally he was able to, I
think, work out an agreement between the union
and steel companies so that by the end of July of
'52, the potential strike was settled, and therefore,
they could move on about their business. The
other aspect of this case was a combination of
politics in terms of his view of Taft-Hartley-his
lack of approval rating in the country at the time
was about the lowest approval rating of any
generation.
Moderator: Right. President Truman was indeed planning to
go in and ask permission after Congress. It
reminds me of when I asked my future father-in-
law for my wife's hand in marriage after she had
already said yes. He said it sounds like the horse
is already out of the barn or whatever. But I think
the idea was if you are going to do this, you have to
do it beforehand and actually get Congress's
approval.
Charlie Hileman-because you clerked for Justice
Burton, who was one of the Truman appointees on
the Court who voted against the President, and
you described the fact that Burton sat right beside
Truman in the Senate-do you think that this was
a difficult thing for your boss, Justice Burton, to
vote against the President who had appointed him?
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Hileman: Well, he not only sat beside him in the Senate for
all those years but they became personal friends
and they really were good friends. I am sure it was
a tough problem for Justice Burton but he never, I
don't recall, ever said anything to me about that.
That is, 'WThat am I going to do with my good
friend Harry Truman, I have to vote against him?"
And so I am sure it was hard to do. I learned later
that President Truman was very upset over the
fact that Justice Burton had voted against him. As
a matter of fact, it was thought that if Burton had
voted to support the President, then Justice Clark
probably would have done the same-Clark was
also a Truman appointee. And then the decision
would have gone the other way.
Moderator: In the end, what from the opinion do you think
persuaded him most? What can we tell persuaded
Justice Burton to vote as he did, against the
President's power?
Hileman: Well, he said in his opinion that the Congress
would have had the power to do this, or authorize
the President to do it. But Congress did not and,
as a matter of fact, the legislative history of the
Taft-Hartley Act showed that it was proposed that
there be a provision authorizing the president to
seize property in the event of an emergency, and
the Congress voted it down. So in effect he said,
"Congress had said you don't have the authority as
President to do this unless we say so." Burton was
a former Senator and he had great respect for the
Senate, and he felt compelled to take that position
and support what Justice Black said.
Moderator: And that becomes important in the Justice Jackson
test, obviously, because this was the case where
the President was acting against the express will of
Congress and that was-
Hileman: Burton left the door open for situations in which
there would be a real emergency situation. He said
in his opinion that this might be different, but the
President had no power under the present
circumstances-this is not comparable to a threat
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of imminent invasion or threatened attack or other
catastrophe. So he intimated in his opinion that
maybe had this been a declared war it would have
been different, and he left the door open for more
serious situations.
Moderator: President Truman was asked by journalists what
in the Constitution gave him the authority to seize
the steel mills. His answer was, "Read the
Constitution. It gives the President the power to
keep the country from going to hell." That was his
foundation for his power.
Jim Paul, you clerked for Chief Justice Vinson,
President Truman's closest friend on the Court.
The Chiefs dissent was a little more sophisticated
than "the President has constitutional power to
keep the country from going to hell." What was the
logic behind Chief Justice Vinson's forceful
dissent?
Paul: Oh, well, it was a shared belief in the validity of
the basic premise on which the seizure decision
was made-a shared belief with the President
(and, I might say, the President's Cabinet, who
swore out affidavits supporting this position-
including Robert Lovett, an eminent American
statesman of that Cabinet2 3). There was an
emergency and we couldn't go without steel in this
conflict-whether we called it a war or not seemed
irrelevant. And the Chiefs second premise was
that Congress had appropriated money to buy
armaments and enacted lots of other legislation to
support this war, all with the support of the
President. And these were laws on the books and
they were active laws. They were there and they
23 The Government relied on affidavits from five senior officials: Secretary of
Defense Robert A. Lovett; Chairman Gordon E. Dean, Atomic Energy Commission;
Administrator Henry H. Fowler, National Production Authority; Secretary of
Commerce Charles W. Sawyer; and Secretary of the Interior Oscar L. Chapman. See
Brief for Petitioner at 9-15, Sawyer v. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., (No. 745), May
1952, reprinted in LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 20, at 608, 616-22; Oral Argument
Transcript, Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Charles Sawyer, (Nos. 744 & 745), May
12, 1952 (oral argument of Solicitor General Philip B. Perlman), reprinted in
LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 20, at 879, 904-05.
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needed to be enforced and, therefore, he did have
the seizure power pursuant to that part of the
Constitution that the President shall execute or
enforce these laws-many laws. And the point
here was that's exactly what the President was
doing-he was maintaining these laws that were
aimed at maintaining the strength of the American
forces. The next point was the President did go
immediately to Congress. He presented to
Congress a formal report saying in effect, "I've
done this. I recognize the power of Congress over
my decision, to repudiate it or leave it alone,
whatever you want. But I felt compelled to do this
in order to preserve the situation." This was not a
decision or an opinion that says the President has
great powers as commander-in-chief. It was not an
opinion that says the President has inherent
powers in wartime, whatever that means. Unlike
the assertions that are made today, in certain
corners of Washington, this is not that expansive.
It was: I did this in a state of emergency but
Congress has the final say-a recognition of the
ultimate jurisdiction of Congress. I don't think, for
all the opinions, that the Court really joined issue
with the Chief Justice on that. I admire Jackson's
concurring opinion; law professors would
particularly love it, but Jackson never really got to
the point of confronting the Chiefs argument.
Finally, one other point as to this failure, dismal
failure, of the Truman appointees to support him.
Truman thought Justice Burton and Justice Clark
had let him down. I wish our good friend Stu
Thayer, who clerked for Clark, was here to defend
him. Unfortunately Stu is no longer with us. But
Truman did say something about this. As to Clark,
he told Fred Vinson, "I wish I had never appointed
that son-of-a-bitch to the Court. It was the worst
mistake I ever made."
Justice Black and the other Justices threw a small
party right after the decision and invited Truman.
Black felt he owed it to Truman to do this, as a
gesture of respect. Truman went, but he was a
little grouchy when the thing started off, but then
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finally he said to Black, "Hugo, I don't like your
law at all but your bourbon is mighty good."
Moderator: Judge Mikva, you clerked for one of the other
dissenters, Justice Minton. What was it that made
him feel so strongly about this case?
Mikva: It was amazing. It was like nine blind men each
feeling a different piece of the elephant, deciding
what the animal is. In my chambers we never got
into this business of the trifurcation of the power.
As far as J. Minton was concerned, this was a
simple question of loyalty to the President. And I
remember he didn't write. He said, "Whatever the
Chief says on this, I'm going to go along with it."
As far as he was concerned, he and the Chief were
of a single mind. And that is that Truman had
appointed him, that Truman said he needed this
power and, by God, they weren't going to take it
away from him. He thought it was important
enough. Truman was in the position and they were
going to let him do it. A lot of things went into
that. Part of it was, this is a property matter-I
don't know how they would have felt if it had been
a liberty matter. Not that Minton was sensitive to
civil liberties, but he certainly would have been
more sensitive to the fact this was simply private
property, and the President was saying it was
important to carry on the war. Secondly, they
recognized, and I even went back and read the
dissent again, there was a little bit of difficulty
talking about this as a war because the President
had said it wasn't a war. It was a police action.
We had never declared the Korean War, it was a
U.N. action. And so the President, in issuing his
proclamation in the first place, relied on a lot of
World War II statutes because technically we were
still in a state of war with either Germany or
Japan, I don't remember which. Japan. And that
was a little farfetched as the rationale for this
important seizure of power that he had exercised.
Really, as far as Minton was concerned, this was
not a matter that needed a lot of deep dissections.
You looked at the President, who had a lot of
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trouble with the Congress and a lot of trouble in
the country at that time. If he said it was
important and you were his friend, you went along.
Moderator: And the threat of communism was very real.
Mikva: The threat of communism was real and you don't
tamper with his power in that kind of respect. I
think it would have been a lot different if Harry
Truman had been riding the crest of a high
popularity wave, with a seventy or eighty percent
approval. There were other actions. I remember
Minton going back to a little bit of history to
remind us of other things that other Presidents
had done way beyond the seizure of the steel mills,
without Congressional approval, and had gotten
away with it. Jefferson had bought a third of the
United States, the Louisiana Purchase, without
getting Congress's approval.
Moderator: Lincoln during the Civil War-
Mikva: Lincoln had kept the Maryland legislature
physically from meeting because they were going to
vote to secede from the Union and he sent soldiers
to keep the legislators from going into the capitol
building. And he got away with it. And at one
point when the Chief Justice issued some kind of a
writ against Lincoln, he ignored it and he got away
with it. And President Roosevelt during World
War II had put all Japanese-Americans into prison
camps-concentration camps-detention camps
they were called-and got away with it. The
Supreme Court ultimately upheld it. And so far as
Sherman Minton was concerned, here was this
good and decent man who thought the country
needed the exercise of his power. He was not going
to be a part of taking it away.
Moderator: Some of the biographies in recent years have
indicated that President Truman consulted with
Chief Justice Vinson before making or during the
time he made the decision to seize the mills, and
perhaps some communications with Justice
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Minton. Do you care to say anything about those
stories?
Mikva: Minton was a part of that poker game that Jim
Paul referred to-he and the Chief Justice were
over at the White House and played poker with
Harry Truman. I got the impression he really was
quite indignant. I don't think he ever used the
language about Harold Burton that the President
used about Clark, but he was quite indignant
about Burton and Clark leaving the ship that way.
I got the impression that Minton had been over at
the White House playing poker some nights before
the decision-I know it was before the decision
came down; whether it was before it was argued or
before the mills were actually seized or not I don't
know. But he came back and he told us that he
was very upset, that he and Vinson and the
President were all very upset about the fact that
Burton didn't understand how important this was
to the President's maintaining his position of
support and if Burton had gone along then Clark
would have gone along.
Moderator: Ken Hechler, who was an advisor to President
Truman, told me during the program five years ago
that there was blue smoke that you could see
coming out of the White House after this decision,
and he was particularly angry, according to Ken
Hechler, at Justice Tom Clark. But those friends
of his whom he had appointed-it clearly meant
something.
Marshall Small, you refer to these Conference
notes that you dug out from Justice Douglas, which
are incredible, actually. They record that Justice
Minton, I believe, gets very excited and pounds on
the table. He says, "The nation is at war. The men
in Korea need the steel." And he was insistent on
1281




it. This was an extremely emotional topic for
certain of the Justices.24
I think we should give credit to David Danelski, a
retired professor from Stanford who's been writing
more than ten years a very objective biography of
Justice Douglas. He kindly went into his
voluminous records and sent me the Conference
notes. Douglas had had a habit of putting all
things into the public record at the Library of
Congress. So there are just all sorts of things
there. That's how we got these fascinating notes.
A couple of questions before we start wrapping up.
David Feller, who was one of the lawyers who
worked alongside Arthur Goldberg representing
the unions, told me the story that the White House
almost had this matter between the Steelworkers
and the steel companies settled. It was only
because the Supreme Court rushed in, in literally
record-breaking time, granted cert, took the case-
the minute that happened, the negotiations
collapsed and that was the end of it. Is this an
historic case that the Supreme Court should have
never taken?
David Feller was a partner of mine later on, as was
Arthur Goldberg. And I think that very much was
a fact-the union and the companies had been
negotiating and even during the seizure, there
were negotiations continuing. If the case had
taken its normal course, they probably would have
reached a settlement. They were very close at the
time the opinion came down. In fact, my co-clerk
and I had this internal ethical battle. We knew the
24 See THE SUPREME COURT IN CONFERENCE (1940-1985), supra note 22, at 181
(emphasis and alteration in original) (reconstructing Justice Minton's remarks in
Conference):
Truman seized the plants because the defense of the country required it.
That is not a legislative power-it is a defensive seizure. The president had
to act. [Douglas: Minton is very excited about this and pounds on the table.]
There is an emergency, and we do care, and we cannot forecast the damage
to the nation. Nothing would be more tragic than our boys in Korea needing
bullets and having none available because of the strike. The president can
seize any property in an emergency.
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25 Id. at 180
Conference).
case was coming down, and we also had heard from
the grapevine that the parties were close to
settling. The question was could one of us call
Arthur Goldberg and tell him to quickly settle it
because the Court was going to go the other way.
We decided, wisely I think in retrospect, that was
not a good idea.
That's why you still have your law license.
That's why I still have my law license. I might not
be here today. But at the time it really was a
matter of timing and there was a lot of scuttlebutt
around the Court even, that if the Court had just
taken the normal course of things, this whole
constitutional dispute might have been avoided
because the parties would have settled. I thought
about that many times in the 2000 election when,
all partisanship aside, it was clear that whether
the Court decided it or the Congress decided it,
that George Bush was going to be the next
President of the United States-it would have
been the same way if the Court had stayed its
hand as usual. I was predicting it was going to do
that with all that assurance and whatnot that I
would know what the Court was going to do. It
never occurred to me that the Court would step in
that quickly and make a decision, because clearly
the political process was working and the Congress
would have made the same decision without the
Court using up its credentials.
Another fascinating thing is that the Justices
didn't disagree with the fact that there was an
emergency here. In fact, the Conference notes that
we refer to show that Justice Jackson says, "If the
president declares an emergency, I will take the
president's judgment."" There were affidavits
from the Secretary of Defense saying there was an
emergency. But as Chief Justice Rehnquist said in
that film, it didn't feel like an emergency to the
country. Is it true that if had there been a real
(emphasis omitted) (reconstructing Justice Jackson's remarks in
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sense of emergency here, the Steel Seizure Case
may have come out differently?
Small: Of course, but I think if you look back on what
happened in the nation's history, I think that
might well have been the case. We only need to
think about what had happened during World War
II with the Japanese internment situation. Clearly
in there it was perceived to be an emergency,
wrongfully perceived, as it turned out later. But as
in so many of these cases they're going to be
decided in an arena of where there is a perception
that there is a felt need for something to be done to
protect the security of the country.
Hileman: I'd like to step in there. I think that that is what
Justice Burton said about a true emergency. I'd
like to raise a different question I'm sure isn't on
your agenda. Marshall Small told us about Justice
Douglas's Conference notes. That's notes that the
Justice took during the secret Conferences the
Justices had in deciding the cases. As far as I
knew, that was sacrosanct-nobody ever knew
about that. And to see that they still exist and
they can be found surprised me a little. Neal, tell
the group what you told us about Justice Black.
Rutledge: Justice Black made, just as Justice Douglas did,
very copious notes about what went on in the
Conference. And we were allowed-he kept those
notes over in the secretary's office. And of course
he was appointed back in '37, so he'd been on the
Court longer than anybody else there and he had
more of these notes. All of the clerks had gone in
and looked at his notes, which were superb. In
fact, one of the notable things about my term as
law clerk to Justice Black was that once at
midnight I was working there alone. I had to go
into the secretary's office to get some of these
Conference notes. I decided to go in through the
Judge's chambers because he wasn't there. I
opened the door, turned on the lights and walked
into the Judge's chambers and a shot rang out. A
bullet came in through the window-whizzed right
by my head. This was within two weeks of Mrs.
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Black's subsequent death. So of course the
Supreme Court police came up and investigated
and couldn't find who fired the shot. They
immediately called Justice Black at his home to
warn him somebody might be out after him. And
he responded by enjoining the police. And he
talked to me thoroughly and very sternly-he said,
"I don't want you to say a word about this to
anybody." He didn't want it to get out and hit the
newspapers because he didn't want his wife to read
about it because she would then be even more
worried and he thought it might have an adverse
effect.
Moderator: On her deathbed.
Rutledge: Right. And then when he got on his own deathbed,
he had these wonderful notes. He called his son,
Hugo Black, Jr., and said, "In the interest of the
confidentiality that I have kept, I ask you to burn
these notes. I tell you, instruct you, to burn these
notes." And very reluctantly, Hugo Jr. burned the
notes in the fireplace there in the Judge's
chambers. I regret that very much because they
would have been well read.
Moderator: As we wrap up, let me just ask you to talk for a
minute about the relevance of the Steel Seizure
Case today. I began by saying it is still the
"granddaddy of the cases" dealing with presidential
power. It's been cited in every major presidential
power case including United States v. Nixon,26
dealing with Watergate tapes, Clinton v. Jones,27
dealing with the civil suit against President
Clinton by Paula Jones. But in post-911 America,
there have been lots of presidential powers
misused, as you know, dealing with the whole
question of the Patriot Act, dealing with enemy
combatants and the rights of enemy combatants,
especially on American soil when they are U.S.
citizens, and more recently having to do with
President Bush's NSA secret surveillance wiretap
26 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
2' 520 U.S. 681 (1997).
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program. All of these have raised presidential
powers issues. What do you think the Steel Seizure
Case tells us, if anything, about those questions?
Mikva: I think that Justice Jackson's concurring opinion
continues to represent kind of continuum of when
the President can act and when he shouldn't act,
and when he needs Congressional approval and
what he can do if it is different than what he wants
to do. Today's New York Times-talk about the
timeliness of this subject-has a long story about
how the number two man in the Department of
Justice tells about the Attorney General, then John
Ashcroft, and several other people threatening to
resign if President Bush didn't call off a secret
wiretap program that was going on that went
beyond the authority that Congress had given in
one of the important pieces of legislation they
passed. In there they cite that the Attorney
General Ashcroft and others were acting on the
recommendations of the group known as the Office
of Legal Counsel, a very important part of the
Department of Justice-the think tank of justice.28
These are the bright lawyers, many of them career
lawyers, who sit and ponder over cases and
precedents. And I'm sure that if OLC wrote a
memo to President Bush or to Attorney General
Ashcroft, the case cited many, many times would
have been Justice Jackson's concurring opinion in
Youngstown Sheet & Tool-maybe even the
majority and the minority dissent as well. But
certainly Justice Jackson's opinion was continuing
to set the parameters in which the President can or
cannot move.
Moderator: I had the privilege of testifying in the Senate last
year when the NSA wiretap program was first
discovered and half of the discussion in there was
about the Steel Seizure Case and its relevance
today.29 If you heard Chief Justice Rehnquist
29 See David Johnston, Bush Intervened in Dispute over N.S.A. Eavesdropping,
N.Y. TIMES, May 16, 2007, at Al.
29 See Wartime Executive Power and the National Security Agency's Surveillance
Authority Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 109-435 (2006)
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talking about President Truman being at his low
ebb of power because Congress hadn't authorized
these steps, there is a strong argument that
President Bush there had gone around what
Congress had done, which defies the law and in
this case may have been in a lower ebb than
President Truman, because his actions came up
against the rights of individual American citizens
under the Bill of Rights. That's very much a
discussion having to do with the Steel Seizure Case
and its significance with respect to presidential
power.
The last thing I want to throw out for
consideration, though, is that over the years
discussing the Steel Seizure Case, there is no one
here, is there, who thinks that President Truman
took these steps out of some crazy desire to gather
a power for himself? I mean, there is no
disagreement, is there, that President Truman was
acting because he thought this was necessary for
the country? Likewise, President Bush, I sincerely
believe, has taken step because he thinks these are
the right thing for the country. But that doesn't
mean the Supreme Court doesn't do its job-and
its clerks work to help the Court do its job-so that
it establishes the boundaries of presidential power.
That's really what this case is about, isn't it?-the
boundaries of Presidential power.
Small: Very seldom will the issue come up to the Court,
though, I think, in the history of the country where
we've seen these sorts of exercises of presidential
power in an emergency. Very seldom has it been
tested in the Court. So there will be very few cases
presumably like the Steel Seizure Case as we go
forward and meet future emergencies.
Paul: I think we're wrapping up, but it occurred to me to
add a quote from Justice Jackson, in the opinion
cited by Bill Rehnquist, Abner and the rest of us.
Jackson said, early on, I think, that these problems
(statement of Ken Gormley, Professor of Constitutional Law, Duquesne University
School of Law, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania).
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of defining the limits of presidential power,
particularly by the Court, are as strange and
difficult as Joseph was confronted with when he
was asked to interpret Pharaoh's dreams.3 0 That
seems to me to have some accuracy. I wouldn't
have wanted to be Joseph in those days because of
Pharaoh's wrath, which might land you in a place
you wouldn't want to be. But I don't think the
decision supplies President Bush with much solace.
Even the dissent in the Steel Seizure Case was very
limited and different from the kinds of presidential
power asserted today. So we're left with Joseph
interpreting dreams again.
Mikva: Justice Black was one of my favorite craftsmen on
the Court. I can't help thinking back over the
years, when this issue has come up, that what
Justice Black wrote as his majority opinion in Steel
Seizure Case was what Professor Sunstein would
call a "minimalist opinion."31 He didn't reach any
further than he needed to do to accommodate the
lowest common denominator to get the Justices to
go along with him. Therefore, as a precedent for
what a President can or cannot do, it has its
limitations. That's why the concurring opinion
may be more useful as a scholarly pursuit. But in
terms of how to decide a case, I think Justice Black
did the minimum interference and harm in the
way the government ought to work.
Hileman: I agree with you absolutely on that, although I
want to say the main argument against the Court's
decision was there was no need for the Court to get
into that serious constitutional issue. There are a
lot of grounds which could have sent the case back
for more evidence and so forth. My own feeling is
30 See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 634 (1952)
(Jackson, J., concurring) ("A judge, like an executive adviser, may be surprised at
the poverty of really useful and unambiguous authority applicable to concrete
problems of executive power as they actually present themselves. Just what our
forefathers did envision, or would have envisioned had they foreseen modern
conditions, must be divined from materials almost as enigmatic as the dreams
Joseph was called upon to interpret for Pharaoh.").
31 See CASs R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE
SUPREME COURT (1999).
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that the majority of the Court felt that it was the
time for the Court to step in and to say what the
limits of a President were. And I think they were
pretty-somewhat-heroic in doing that.
Before I turn this back over to John Barrett, I'll
just conclude by saying that in the end it didn't
hurt President Truman's legacy all that much, did
it? We now know, after David McCullough's fine
work on him and the popularity of President
Truman today, that he did what he thought was
necessary, the Court did what it thought was
necessary, and that's the beauty of our system.
And his coarse language makes him a solid, great
guy, just like Andrew Jackson.
Please join me in thanking the panelists. What we
see here is really that fifty-five years is a blink,
and that this country's big problems and big
challenges are perpetual ones. We had, in 1951-
1952, a great Supreme Court well served by
extraordinarily talented law clerks. Our hope is
that today too we have a great Supreme Court,
served well by extraordinary law clerks, with
abilities to grapple with the issues that challenge
us, just as these men and their bosses did. Please
join me in thanking Marshall Small, Neal
Rutledge, Charles Hileman, James Paul, Abner
Mikva and Professor Ken Gormley.
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APPENDIX
JUSTICES OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES AND
THEIR LAW CLERKS, OCTOBER TERM 1951
OCTOBER 1, 1951-JUNE 9, 1952
Chief Justice Fred M. Vinson (commissioned June 21, 1946)
Law Clerks: Howard J. Trienens, Newton N. Minow and
James C.N. Paul
Justice Hugo L. Black (commissioned August 18, 1937)
Law Clerks: C. Sam Daniels* and Neal P. Rutledge
Justice Stanley Reed (commissioned January 27, 1938)
Law Clerks: John D. Calhoun* and Lewis C. Green*
Justice Felix Frankfurter (commissioned January 20, 1939)
Law Clerks: Abram J. Chayes* and Vincent L. McKusick
Justice William 0. Douglas (commissioned April 15, 1939)
Law Clerk: Marshall L. Small
Justice Robert H. Jackson (commissioned July 11, 1941)
Law Clerks: C. George Niebank, Jr.* and William H.
Rehnquist*
Justice Harold H. Burton (commissioned September 22, 1945)
Law Clerks: John W. Douglas and Charles C. Hileman, III
Justice Tom C. Clark (commissioned August 19, 1949)
Law Clerks: Stuart W. Thayer* and C. Richard Walker*
Justice Sherman Minton (commissioned October 5, 1949)
Law Clerks: Raymond W. Gray, Jr. and Abner J. Mikva
* Deceased
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